TANI Naoki. Concentration and Separation of Powers in Japan's Parliamentary Cabinet System: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Bicameral System. Annual Bulletin of Research Institute for Social Sciences. 2009. 39. 20-28
TANI Naoki. Concentration and Separation of Powers in Japan's Parliamentary Cabinet System: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Bicameral System. Annual Bulletin of Research Institute for Social Sciences. 2009. 39. 20-28
The Efficiency and Problems of Financial Institutions in Kyoto. PHP Business Review. 2003. Vol.21. 48-49
Naoki Tani. Administering the Law and Conducting Affairs of State: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Parliamentary Cabinet System. Ryukoku Journal of Economic Studies. 2009. 49. 2. 29-40
TANI Naoki. Concentration and Separation of Powers in Japan's Parliamentary Cabinet System: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Bicameral System. Annual Bulletin of Research Institute for Social Sciences. 2009. 39. 20-28
コメント:藤原賢也(神戸大学)"How Liable Should a Lender be?: The Allocation of the Burden of Proof and the Liability of Financial Institution as an Insider."
(金融ゲーム理論コンファランス 1998)
コメント:東京大学清水克俊"Recapitalization, Moral Hazard Behavior and Commitment to Bailing Out the Insolvent Bank"
(日本ファイナンス学会第5回大会 1997)