Keisuke Bando, Ryo Kawasaki. Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem. Games and Economic Behavior. 2021. 130. 211-223
Keisuke Bando, Toshiyuki Hirai, and Jun Zhang. Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts. Games and Economic Behavior. 2021. 129. 503-512
Keisuke Bando and Toshiyuki Hirai. Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching. Journal ofEconomic Theory. 2021. 196. 105292
Yasushi Kawase and Keisuke Bando. Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm. International Journal of Game Theory. 2021. 50. forthcoming-546
Keisuke Bando, Toshiyuki Hirai, John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers. Corrigendum to “Multilateral matching” [J. Econ. Theory 156 (2015) 175-206]. Journal of Economic Theory. 2019. 184. 104933
Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching,
(The 20th Annual SAET Conference 2021)
Subgame Perfect Equilibria Under the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
(5th International Workshop on Matching Under Preferences (MATCH-UP 2019) 2019)
Existence of a stable outcome under observable substitutability across doctors in many-to-many matching with contracts,
(UECE Lisbon Meetings Game Theory and Applications 2018)
On Stable Outcomes of the Multilateral Matching
(European Meeting on Game Theory (SING13) 2017)
Essential μ-compatible subgames for obtaining a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in an assignment game
(The 9th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2016)