研究者
J-GLOBAL ID:201801016350388267   更新日: 2022年05月09日

芹澤 成弘

セリザワ シゲヒロ | Serizawa Shigehiro
所属機関・部署:
職名: 教授
研究分野 (1件): 理論経済学
研究キーワード (5件): 市場設計理論 ,  社会選択論 ,  オークション理論 ,  制度設計理論 ,  ゲーム理論
競争的資金等の研究課題 (2件):
  • 2020 - 2025 マーケット・デザインの国際共同研究
  • 2019 - 2022 大学の研究生産性の国際比較(経済学の場合)
論文 (39件):
  • 芹澤成弘, 柴田章久, 高橋悟. 経済・社会科学系4附置研究所及びシンガポール国立大学経済学部、香港大学経営経済学部の研究生産性比較調査(2021年). ISER Discussion Paper. 2022. 1173
  • Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa. A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices for an Arbitrary Number of Agents and Objects. ISER Discussion Paper. 2022. 1161
  • Shigehiro Serizawa, Takehito Masuda, Toyotaka Sakai, Takuma Wakayama. The Net Effect of Advice on Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction. Experimental Economics. 2021. Forthcoming
  • Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa. Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects. Social Choice and Welfare. 2021
  • Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa. A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects. Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research Osaka University. 2021. 1134
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MISC (3件):
  • Yu Zhou, Youngsub Chun, Shigehiro Serizawa. A Characterization of the Vickery Rule in Slot Allocation Problems. Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. 2021. 1120
  • Takehito Masuda, Ryo Mikami, Toyotaka Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa, Takuma Wakayama. The Net Effect of Advice on Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auctionn. Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. 2020. 1109
  • Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa. Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects. Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. 2020
講演・口頭発表等 (53件):
  • Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: expost revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
    (Economic Seminar 2019)
  • Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market
    (III SPAIN-JAPAN MEETING ON ECONOMIC THEORY)
  • Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market
    (MICROECONOMICS SEMINAR 2019)
  • Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market
    (2019 NANJING INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORY & THE SIXTH MICROECONOMICS WORKSHOP)
  • Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market
    (The 19th Annual SAET Conference)
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