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J-GLOBAL ID：201801016350388267   Update date: Sep. 29, 2025

SERIZAWA Shigehiro

セリザワ シゲヒロ | SERIZAWA Shigehiro
Affiliation and department：
Osaka University of Economics Faculty of Economics Department of Economics

About Osaka University of Economics Faculty of Economics Department of Economics


Job title： Professor
Research field  (1)： Theoretical economics
Research keywords  (5)： Market Design ,  社会選択論 ,  オークション理論 ,  制度設計理論 ,  ゲーム理論
Research theme for competitive and other funds  (27)：
  • 2022 - 2027 マーケット・デザインの最先端研究と社会実装
  • 2021 - 2026 オークション理論のフロンティアと応用
  • 2021 - 2026 オークション理論のフロンティアと応用
  • 2020 - 2025 International Joint Research on Market Design
  • 2020 - 2025 Economic stagnation and widening wealth inequality: Crises of the world economy and a construction of a unified macroeconomic theory
Show all
Papers (40)：
  • Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa. A General Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices. Games and Economic Behavior. 2024
  • Shigehiro Serizawa, Takehito Masuda, Toyotaka Sakai, Takuma Wakayama. “The Net Effect of Advice on Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction,”. Experimental Economics, Vol. 25, Issue 3, 902-941. 2022. Forthcoming
  • Shigehiro Serizawa, Akihisa Shibata, Satoru Takahashi. The Productivity Rankings of Research Institutions of Economics and Social Sciences in Japan Compared to NUS and HKU, 2021: Evaluation by the Publications in Major Academic Journals. 2022. 1173
  • Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa. A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices for an Arbitrary Number of Agents and Objects. ISER Discussion Paper. 2022. 1161
  • Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa. Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects. Social Choice and Welfare. 2021. 60. 1-2. 103-120
ｍore...
MISC (15)：
  • Yu Zhou, Youngsub Chun, Shigehiro Serizawa. A Characterization of the Vickery Rule in Slot Allocation Problems. 2021. 1120
  • Takehito Masuda, Ryo Mikami, Toyotaka Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa, Takuma Wakayama. The Net Effect of Advice on Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auctionn. 2020. 1109
  • Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa. Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects. Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. 2020
  • 二神 孝一, 神谷 和也, 芹澤 成弘. 5大学経済学研究科及び附置研究所の研究業績比較調査(2014年). 経済セミナー = The keizai seminar. 2015. 684. 71-77
  • 芹澤 成弘. ゲーム理論入門(vol.11・最終回)動学ゲーム(4)不完備情報動学ゲーム. 経済セミナー. 2008. 635. 90-101
ｍore...
Lectures and oral presentations  (61)：
  • Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market: The Serial Vickrey Mechanism
    (2022 INFORMS Annual Meeting 2022)
  • Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism
    (Workshop on Mechanism Design and Welfare Economics 2022)
  • Factors causing non-sincere bidding in the Vickrey auction
    (2022 European ESA Meeting in Bologna 2022)
  • Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism
    (2022 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in East and South-East Asia 2022)
  • Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism
    (Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2022 Conference Australia 2022)
ｍore...
Professional career (1)：
  • PhD(Economics),University of Rochester (University of Rochester)
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